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In many developing countries, a significant portion of the wage distribution is
found below the legal minimum wage. In order to fully understand the nature of
this non-compliance, we need to compare the counterfactual wage distribution
without the minimum wage law to the current wage distribution. Such a comparison
could reveal partial compliance, where employers raise wages some of the way to the
minimum wage, to balance out the benefits of non-compliance with the costs and
penalties to the extent that they depend on the gap between the legal minimum
wage and the wage actually paid. This paper presents a simple model of such partial
compliance and uses its predictions to structure an empirical investigation of the
impact of introducing a minimum wage law for agricultural workers in South Africa. We
find that partial compliance is indeed taking place and further, the lowest wages are
being raised disproportionately, consistent with the predictions of the model.
JEL codes: J23, J25, J31, J32, J38, J43
Keywords: Minimum Wages, South Africa, Compliance, Enforcement, Agriculture, Index
of Minimum Wage Violation, Wage1 Introduction
According to basic theory, the introduction of a fully enforced minimum wage in a
perfectly competitive labor market will increase the wages of the employed to the mini-
mum wage, but reduce employment. As minimum wages have been introduced and
increased in many countries around the world, there have been extensive empirical
assessments of the economic and welfare consequences of such an intervention. Whilst
the evidence remains predominantly concentrated in developed economies, empirical
assessments for the developing world are growing in prevalence. The effects on em-
ployment remain intensely debated in large part due to the substantive heterogeneity
in measured outcomes. Indeed, the impact of a minimum wage on employment re-
mains the dominant question in the literature.
But in many countries, then particularly in developing countries, a significant portion
of the wage distribution is found below the legal minimum wage. Less focus and atten-
tion has been given to understanding changes in wage levels below the stipulated legal
minimum, given that the legislation is rarely fully enforced. In order to understand the
nature of this non-compliance, we need to compare the counterfactual wage distribu-
tion without the minimum wage law to the current wage distribution. Such a compari-
son could reveal partial compliance with the law. There are two senses in which a
firm’s compliance with a minimum wage regulation could be partial, relative to the
situation with no regulation. First, the firm could raise the wage it pays its workers
somewhat but not all the way to the minimum wage. Second, it could pay some of its2015 Bhorat et al. Open Access This article is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International
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these strategies will depend on the enforcement regime—the probability of being
caught, and the level and structure of penalties if caught. It will also depend on non-
official, social costs of non-compliance.
Our previous work on minimum wage regulation in South Africa has quantified the
degree of non-compliance, taking into account not only the fact of violation but also
the extent and depth of violation of the minimum wage law (Bhorat et al. 2012, 2013a).
We have introduced an index of minimum wage violation which assigns different
weights to the depth of violation, and tried to relate this to enforcement resources
(Bhorat et al. 2013b). Other work has also explored the employment consequences
of the introduction of the minimum wage law in different sectors, including in
agriculture where, for example, we have found evidence of both employment losses
and rising wages (Bhorat et al. 2014). There is limited work internationally in try-
ing to understand responses to the minimum wage below the minimum wage. The
work of Neumark et al. (2000) though, does attempt to model how minimum
wages changes impact on the wages of workers throughout the wage distribution.
As such then, it is a key insight of the paper that employment, wage and hours of
work responses, of low-wage versus high-wage workers to minimum wage changes,
will differ. There is however, no framework here building below minimum wage
levels as a measure of non-compliance.
Our objective in this paper is to provide a model and empirical evidence of partial
compliance as a response to the promulgation of a minimum wage. The model predicts
partial adjustment of wages and furthermore predicts, under certain conditions, that
the lowest wages will be adjusted upwards disproportionately. Using fourteen waves of
the South African Labour Force Survey (LFS) which span the introduction of the mini-
mum wage, we test for these predictions using an index of non-compliance or violation,
and find that the predictions of the model are borne out in the data.
The plan of the paper is as follows. Section 2 sets out the theoretical model to aid
intuition and to structure our empirical work. It shows how even in a competitive labor
market, imperfect enforcement can lead to a distribution of wages between the mini-
mum wage and the competitive wage. Section 3 introduces our dataset, briefly de-
scribes the institutional structure of minimum wage enforcement in South African
agriculture, and sets out the empirical strategy. With this background, in Section 4 we
present the empirical results on partial wage compliance in South African agriculture.
Section 5 concludes the paper.
2 A simple model of partial compliance
The basic reference in the literature on minimum wage compliance is Ashenfelter and
Smith (1979). This paper formulated the gains from non-compliance taking into ac-
count the probability of getting caught and the penalty if caught, and applied the theory
to the US minimum wage. Their measure of non-compliance was based on whether a
worker was earning below the sectoral minimum wage, and not on the depth of the
violation. They argued that “government enforcement, while not inducing anything like
complete compliance, does have an impact” (p 333). Ashenfelter and Smith (1979)
theoretical argument was modified, corrected and extended in a series of papers
(Grenier, 1982; Chang and Ehrlich, 1985; Yaniv, 2001). Chang and Ehrlich (1985)
Bhorat et al. IZA Journal of Labor & Development  (2015) 4:18 Page 3 of 20for example, pointed out that neither Ashenfelter and Smith (1979) nor Grenier (1982),
fully incorporated the firm’s employment responses to the enforcement regime itself. They
also introduced a formulation of the penalty of being caught as a multiple of the total
underpayment of wages relative to the minimum wage.
Ashenfelter and Smith (1979), Grenier (1982), and Chang and Ehrlich (1985) all
assumed the firm to be risk neutral. Yaniv (2001) extended the earlier analysis by introdu-
cing risk aversion, and also by introducing partial non-compliance, which he modelled as
the firm deciding to pay some workers the minimum wage and others the competitive
wage. Yaniv (2001) retains the Chang and Ehrlich (1985) formulation of the penalty, but
introduced the dependence of the probability of inspection (and therefore the probability
of getting caught) on the number of workers not receiving the minimum wage, and the
penalty as increasing in the number of workers not being paid the minimum wage. The
most striking result of Yaniv (2001) is that the total employment is independent of the
enforcement parameters, depending only on the minimum wage as if it was fully enforced.
Where enforcement makes an impact is on how many workers are paid the minimum
wage. However, note Yaniv’s (2001) assumption that all workers not paid the minimum
wage are paid the competitive wage, whereas firms could in fact pay these workers
somewhat higher wages so as to reduce the penalty if caught. We emphasize this dimen-
sion of adjustment in this paper.
All of the above analyses are in the context of a competitive labor market. Basu et al.
(2010) take up the strand of the literature which follows on from Stigler’s (1946) analysis
for a monopsonistic labor market. For this case they analyze the determinants of the
minimum wage and enforcement intensity chosen by the government, to optimize an
objective function taking into account both equity and efficiency. On the way to this they
show that the non-complying monopsonist will choose a wage level between the low
monopsony wage and the higher, but imperfectly enforced, minimum wage. In this sense
there is also partial compliance which again depends on the enforcement variables.
We will focus here on the competitive labor market case and present a simple model
of partial compliance which combines elements from different parts of the literature, to
motivate and to frame the empirical analysis to follow. The linear-quadratic formula-
tion employed here is simple enough to give closed form solutions, but rich enough to
ground intuitions and suggest empirical approaches.
Let output y be given by




where l is labor and a and b are parameters of the production function which differen-
tiate firms from each other.
If the wage is w then profit is




For a competitive firm facing a wage wc the profit maximizing level of employment
and associated profit are given respectively by:
lc ¼ a−wcð Þ=b ð3Þ
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Now introduce a minimum wage m. With full enforcement the employment leveland profits are of course given by:
lm ¼ a−mð Þ=b ð5Þ
πm ¼ a−mð Þ2=2b ð6Þ
These will be useful as reference points for later comparison.Clearly, with m > wc, employment and profits are lower with a fully enforced mini-
mum wage. Thus there are incentives for non-compliance; the extent of which will
depend on the probability of getting caught and the fine if so caught. As noted in the
introduction, there are two dimensions of non-compliance: The subminimum wage
that is paid, and the number of workers who are paid this low wage. In this model we
focus on the first of these dimensions, and all workers will be paid the subminimum
wage in the event of non-compliance.1 The firm is assumed to be risk neutral. Denoting
the probability of inspection as p and the fine as f, the expected profit when the wage
paid is w is given by:




What determines p and f? The institutional framework in many countries, includingSouth Africa as described in the next section, is that inspections are determined by a
combination of complaints received and targeted inspections by the inspectorate. We
assume that the probability of receiving a complaint is proportional to the underpay-
ment (m − w). Further, given the cost effectiveness of inspecting larger establishments,
we assume that the probability of targeted inspections increases with size of establish-
ment. Putting these considerations together, we specify p as:
p ¼ λ m−wð Þl ð8Þ
where λ is a constant of proportionality (> 0). On the fine if caught, we follow
most minimum wage enforcement regimes in making it a multiple of the total
underpayment:
f ¼ γ m−wð Þl ð9Þ
where γ > 0.
Putting together the expressions for p and f we get expected profits as:







λ γ m−wð Þ2l2 ð10Þ
where the multiple 12
 
has been introduced in the last term to simplify the expres-
sions that follow without affecting anything of substance. We now model this risk
neutral firm as maximizing profits by choosing two variables. First is the usual
choice of employment l. The second, however, is the choice of wage w to pay.
Since the minimum wage m has been set to be above the competitive wage wc, so
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workers it wants at wage w. Of course, the choice of l and w has to take into ac-
count the fact that these choices will affect the probability of inspection and the
fine if caught.
Maximizing πe with respect to l and w, the first order conditions are given by:
∂πe
∂l
¼ a−bl−w− λ γ m−wð Þ2l ¼ 0 ð11Þ
∂πe
∂w
¼ −l þ λ γ m−wð Þl2 ¼ 0 ð12Þ
Solving these gives the following expressions for the optimum values of employmentand wage:
le ¼ a−mð Þ=b ð13Þ
we ¼ m− b
λ γ a−mð Þ ð14Þ
Note that (14) is constrained by the fact that we need we > wc and the parameter
configuration has to satisfy this relationship. Thus employment is the same as with a
fully enforced minimum wage as in Yaniv (2001), and is predicted to decline with the
minimum wage. It is independent of the enforcement parameters λ and γ. This is
because the response to enforcement comes through choice of wage paid, to which we
now turn.
The expression for we shows that there will be a spread of wages below the minimum
wage. Write the wage gap g as
g ¼ m−we ¼ b
λ γ a−mð Þ ð15Þ
Prior to the introduction of the minimum wage, every worker is paid the com-petitive wage wc and employment is lc. When the minimum wage m is introduced
it has two effects. First, it reduces employment from lc to le. Second, it increases
wages from wc to we; the increase depending on the productivity parameters and
on the enforcement parameters. Higher productivity firms (higher a and lower b)
will pay higher wages and will have a smaller gap relative to the minimum wage.
A higher minimum wage will increase the wage gap for every productivity level,
but greater intensity of enforcement, as measured by higher values of λ or γ, will
lower the wage gap.
Particular attention is paid in this paper to the proportional shortfall of the actual





λ γm a−mð Þ ð16Þ
It is easy to see that this proportional gap also falls with higher productivity and
greater intensity of enforcement. However,
∂v
∂m
¼ b 2m−að Þ
λ γ a−mð Þ ð17Þ
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greater or lesser than one half of a. Further,
∂2v
∂m∂v
¼ b a−3mð Þ
λ γm2 a−mð Þ4 ð18Þ
whose sign depends on whether m is greater or lesser than one third of a. Putting
together (17) and (18) we can show that if m is less than one third of a, then an in-
crease in the minimum wage will reduce the proportionate gap by more, the larger was
the gap to start with. However, for other parameter values the proportionate gap,
although it will always fall, may fall less, the higher is the gap. The general point emer-
ging from the discussion surrounding equations (17) and (18) is that even in this sim-
plified model the behaviour of the proportional gap is complicated and ambiguous, and
thus an empirical matter for further investigation.
Before concluding this theory section we note that although we have interpreted the
costs of non-compliance for firms in terms of official enforcement and fines, other in-
terpretations are also possible. For example, there might be peer pressures and social
sanctions in terms of reputational effects for non-compliers. The magnitudes of these
would naturally depend on the extent of non-compliance. Thus the costs of non-
compliance specified in (10) as proportional to (m −w)2l2 can be interpreted directly as
social opprobrium, being in proportion to the square of the shortfall of the wage bill
from the minimum wage level. We will not be able to distinguish empirically between
these different forces. But they all predict partial compliance to different degrees.
Thus we have rationalized the phenomenon of partial adjustment to a minimum
wage when there is imperfect enforcement. However, even in this quite simple setting
we get a rich set of predictions. There is partial adjustment but its extent is an empir-
ical question. The next section begins our empirical analysis of partial compliance upon
the introduction of the minimum wage in South African agriculture.
3 Data and empirical strategy
Legally binding national minimum wages set by the State have a relatively short history
in South Africa. While there is currently no single national minimum wage, wage set-
ting does apply to workers in specific sectors and occupations.2 The first such mini-
mum wage policy was introduced in 1999 in the Contract Cleaning industry. This was
followed by legislation for Private Security workers (2001), Domestic workers (2002)
and workers in Wholesale and Retail (2003). Minimum wages in this case form part of
a Sectoral Determination, which in addition to wages provides legislation on working
hours, employment contracts, and over time. Officially the Minister of Labour is re-
sponsible for introducing and updating these wage schedules but the Minister's deci-
sions rely on recommendations from a tripartite committee known as the Employment
Conditions Commission (ECC). State institutions have also been introduced to enforce
these new wage laws.
The minimum wage law in the Agricultural sector was promulgated in December
2002 and came into effect on the 1st of March 2003, with separate wage levels for
rural and urban areas. Wages were initially set at 800 Rands per month in urban
areas (Area A) and 650 Rands per month in rural areas (Area B), and adjusted up-
ward annually.3 Figure 1 shows the annual adjustments over a four year period
Fig. 1 Legislated minimum wage (in Rands/month), Area A and B, 2003–2007. Source: Department of
Labour, Agriculture Sectoral Determinations (2003–2007)
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pact of this minimum wage on employment in Bhorat et al. (2014). We find sig-
nificant reductions in employment in the short run. We also find a significant rise
in average wages. But what exactly happened to wages below the minimum? Was
there full compliance, or partial compliance? And if compliance was partial, what
were the nature of the adjustments that took place—were the lowest wages raised propor-
tionately more, or less? Answering these questions is not straightforward because of the
econometric issues involved in constructing appropriate counterfactuals but we attempt
to explore them here.
Labor regulations in South Africa are accompanied by inspections and penalties for
violations. These inspections are carried out by labour inspectors employed by the
Inspection and Enforcement Services (IES) unit within the Department of Labour
(DoL). The penalties for non-compliance are shown in Table 1. The upper section of
the table refers to violations not concerned with underpayment of wages which attract
specific monetary fines. The lower section refers to violations that do involve underpay-
ment of wages and it is clear that while repeat offences and greater levels of underpay-
ment attract larger penalties, in general the value of the fines are low. Also, given the
resources allocated to the inspectorate, and the relatively small number of inspectors,
the inspection rate is not high. For example, in the Western Cape Province (the only
province for which we have detailed inspection data) the simple probability of a farmer
being visited by a labor inspector in 2007 was 11 percent. The inspectorate also tries to
ensure compliance through a combination of individual farm inspections, advertising,
advocacy sessions with workers, and training programmes (Western Cape Government,
2010). There is thus an explicit attempt to publicise the law and create social pressure
for compliance, alongside a more conventional inspection and enforcement structure.
This social pressure can come from a number of sources, including peer effects. The
influence of the latter effects though, is difficult to test with the data available to us,
Table 1 Maximum permissible fines for violation (Schedule 2 of the BCEA, 1997)
Maximum permissible fine not involving underpayment
No previous violation R100 per employee
No previous violation in respect of the same provision of
the Act
R200 per employee
A previous violation the same year or two violations in
respect to the same provision during the past 3 years
R300 per employee
3 previous violations of the same provision within 3 years R400 per employee
4 previous violations of the same provision within 3 years R500 per employee
Maximum permissible fine involving underpayment
No previous violation 25% of the underpayment, including any interest
owing on the amount at the time of the order
A previous violation of the same provision during the
past 3 years
50% of the amount due including applicable
interest
A previous violation of the same provision within a year,
or 2 previous violations, or 2 previous violations of the
same provision
75% of the amount due, including applicable
interest
3 previous violations of the same provision during the
past three years
100% of the amount due including applicable
interest
3 previous violations of the same provision during the
past three years
200% of the amount due including applicable
interest
Fines not involving underpayment have been amended (Department of Labour 2014) but the figures above are those
that relate to the period in question
Bhorat et al. IZA Journal of Labor & Development  (2015) 4:18 Page 8 of 20and at this stage it is not possible to separate out official from non-official determinants
of compliance. We restrict our focus to the nature of compliance.
The primary data for this paper are drawn from 14 waves of the South African
Labour Force Survey (LFS), from February 2001 to September 2007, covering the
period before and after the introduction of the minimum wage.4 The LFS is a bi-
annual, rotating panel survey conducted in February/March and September each year.
Our chosen sample includes five waves before the minimum wage legislation became
effective (March 2003), and nine afterwards. Given that the law became effective at
around the same time as the first 2003 survey we exclude the March 2003 wave from
our econometric analysis. The remaining 13 waves are pooled and treated as repeated
cross sections over time. The LFS covers approximately 30,000 households in each
wave and this includes between 2,000 and 3,300 farmworkers per wave, over the
period.
September 2003 is treated as the first wave where the direct impacts of the law
should begin to be evident. As noted earlier two separate wage levels were prescribed
for full-time farmworkers, according to geographic location: a higher minimum wage
(Rands 800) for those working within urbanised municipal areas classified as Area A,
and a lower wage (Rands 650) for predominantly rural areas classified as Area B.5 In
order to evaluate which minimum wage applied to each individual, it was necessary to
assign individuals to geographic areas.6 This was done by matching geographic infor-
mation available in the LFS to areas A and B listed in the Sectoral Minimum Wage
schedules. The sample includes both rural and urban workers, and includes full-time
and part-time workers — defined as individuals working for at least 27 h per week, or
less than 27 h a week, respectively. We restrict the sample to include only those classi-
fied as employees.
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by random allocation to a uniform distribution within the bracket to maintain vari-
ation.7 This accounts for between five and ten percent of the sample in each wave, on
average. All monthly wages are then combined and converted into hourly wages, which
we use for analysis. Employed individuals reporting zero or missing wages are
excluded.
The key focus of our analysis is the impact of the introduction of the minimum wage
on sub-minimum wages. For each agricultural worker in each wave of the survey we
define
vα m; wð Þ ¼ m−w½ Þ=mα if w < m;
vα m; wð Þ ¼ 0 if w ≥m ð19Þ
where m is the official minimum wage in a given year, and w captures wages for each
individual worker. We refer to vα as the “violation index” for a particular worker. When
α =0 this is simply a count variable which takes on the value of 1 if the worker is below
the minimum wage and 0 if the worker is above. When α =1, the violation index is a
measure of the proportional gap between farmworker wages and the minimum wage.
This is of course the gap variable in equation (16). When α =2, vα becomes the squared
gap and gives more weight to wages that fall further below the minimum. Our empir-
ical focus will be on the effects of the law on v1 and v2 across workers.
Given the violation index, or proportional gap of reach worker, a measure of the ag-
gregate gap is simply the average of (19) over all workers. Denoting the aggregate gap
of violation as Vα, if h(w) is the frequency density of w then
V α ¼
Z




m−w½ Þ=mαh wð Þdw
ð20Þ
This index of aggregate minimum wage non-compliance, which is analogous to the
FGT index of poverty (Foster et al. 1984), was introduced by Bhorat et al. (2012, 2013a).
We will also present patterns and trends in the aggregate gap in the next section.
To estimate the effects of the law on compliance we use two specifications. We
first employ a standard difference-in-differences model analogous to Card and
Krueger (1994):
Y ikt ¼ β0 þ β1POSTt þ β2Farmworkerk þ β3POSTt  Farmworkerk þ Xijt þ εikt
ð21Þ
where, Yikt is the outcome of interest (v1 , v2) for individual i, in group k, in period t.
POSTt is the time dummy which captures ‘before-and-after’ effects. Farmworkerk is the
dummy for whether an individual is in the treatment or comparison group (k = 1, 2),
which equals 1 if the individual is a farmworker and 0 if they are in the comparison
group. POSTt * Farmworkerk is the difference-in-differences term which measures the
difference between the outcomes of the treatment group versus those of the compari-
son group, across the pre- and post-law periods. This tests whether the observed
changes in violation were shared by similar workers to whom the law did not apply,
and for workers in the comparison group we calculate V1 using the agricultural
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ference between what happened to farmworkers in the post-law period versus what
happened to comparison group. This will correctly identify the effects of the minimum
wage if there were no idiosyncratic shocks, in addition to the law that only affected
farmworkers in the post period.8 Xijt comparisons for various worker characteristics
such as Age, Education, Race, provincial agricultural GDP, and if the individual has a
written contract, and we run the regression with and without comparisons.
In an attempt to provide a counterfactual for what would have happened to wages in
the absence of the minimum wage law we identify a comparison group that has similar
characteristics to farmworkers. This is one part of our difference-in-differences identifi-
cation strategy, which compares changes in farmworker compliance outcomes to a
comparison group of comparable workers. The comparison group is made up of em-
ployees in unskilled or ‘elementary’ occupations, based on the 4-digit SASCO occupa-
tion codes and ISIC industry codes, earning less than the Basic Condition of
Employment Act's (BCEA) income cut-off of R9 631 per month, aged between 15–65,
who have completed no more than 12 years of schooling. In addition, union members,
and those in sectors affected by another minimum wage, are excluded. For clarity, this
group includes occupations such as: street vendors, packers, manufacturing and trans-
port laborers, and elementary machine operators. The agricultural minimum wage law
does not apply to them. Changes in the comparison group’s wages provide an indica-
tion of movements in the economy that coincided with the period when the agricul-
tural minimum wage was introduced, but were not the result of that policy change.
Secondly we specify another difference-in-differences model which tests to see
whether the violation gap increased more in districts where farmworker wages were
lower in the pre-law period9:
Y ijt ¼ θ0 þ θPOSTt þ θ2WGj þ θ3POSTt WGj þ Xijt þ vijt ; ð22Þ
where, Yijt is the outcome of interest (v1, v2) for individual i, in district j, in period t.
POSTt is the time dummy, and Xijt comparisons for various worker characteristics. The
wage gap (WGj) is a constructed variable which identifies cross-sectional variation
between District Councils in the pre-law period. The wage gap is represented by:
WGj ¼ log minimum wj
 h i





where wj is the initial minimum wage in district j and w
0
j is the median agricultural
worker wage in district j, in the year before the law was introduced. w
0
j is calculated
using real wages in 2002. Areas with a larger gap in the pre-law period would be
expected to experience greater increases in wages in the post-law period if the law was
binding.10
In equation (21) β1 indicates the changes in the post-law period for both groups, β2
gives the average difference between farmworkers and the comparison group over the
full period, and β3 shows the change for farmworkers in the post-law period relative to
the comparison group. In equation (22) the parameter θ2 represents the average differ-
ence in outcomes for workers in low wage gap versus high wage gap areas across the
entire period. θ3 is the difference-in-differences parameter, and tells us how much more
outcomes changed in the post-law period, in areas where the wage gap was largest.
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after the law for a particular district, conditional on the wage gap being zero in that
district. As in all such natural experiments we must assume that in the absence of the
law, agricultural wages would be on the same general trend across districts, as well as
for both groups of workers.
4 Results
Tables 2 and 3 present the results for the aggregate index of violation in equation (20)
above, for the sample of farmworkers, in Areas A and B respectively. The first key re-
sult here is that V0, the proportion of farmworkers earning less than the minimum
wage specified for workers in both areas, declines over the period 2001–2007. This
decline is relatively slow in both areas — 11 percent in area A and 18 percent in
area B — but is greater for farmworkers in Area B, who comprise 70–80 percent
of all farmworkers over the period. Taken together, however, the results show that
the proportion of workers whose wages increase to a level at or above the minimum wage
is relatively small. Put differently, the estimates indicate substantial non-compliance with
the law, as 54 percent of farmworkers in area A and 67 percent of workers in area B here
still earn below the legislated minimum. Importantly, this measure can tell us nothing
about wage movements below the minimum wage, which is in fact where the most signifi-
cant changes have taken place. V1, measuring the proportional gap between an individual’s
wage and the minimum wage, averaged over all individuals, is far more instructive in this
regard. Table 2 reveals a decrease in the depth of aggregate violation: V1 declines by 18
percent over the whole period but in particular falls by 30 percent in the year directly after
the introduction of the law. In Area B Table 3 shows much larger decreases in the depth
of violation, where overall V1 falls by 45 percent, with a 24 percent decrease between
2002 and September 2003.Table 2 Aggregate index of violation, Area A
Year v0 v1 v2 v1/v0
2001 0.61 0.20 0.10 0.33
(0.026) (0.014) (0.008)
2002 0.66 0.22 0.10 0.34
(0.025) (0.021) (0.016)
2003 0.60 0.15 0.06 0.26
(0.023) (0.010) (0.006)
2004 0.64 0.17 0.07 0.27
(0.024) (0.010) (0.006)
2005 0.65 0.19 0.09 0.30
(0.028) (0.017) (0.009)
2006 0.63 0.18 0.08 0.29
(0.033) (0.017) (0.009)
2007 0.54 0.16 0.07 0.30
(0.034) (0.0174) (0.009)
Standard errors in parenthesis. V0 is a headcount index which shows the percentage of farmworkers earning below the
applicable minimum, V1 is the average distance of wages below the minimum, and V2 is the square of this gap which
places more weight on observations furthest below the minimum. V1/V0 is a simple ratio but allows for an easy
interpretation of V1 and can be read as: workers in year ‘x’ on average earn V
1/V0 below the minimum
Table 3 Aggregate index of violation, Area B
Year v0 v1 v2 v1/v0
2001 0.82 0.39 0.22 0.48
(0.014) (0.010) (0.008)
2002 0.83 0.39 0.23 0.48
(0.012) (0.011) (0.009)
2003 0.75 0.30 0.16 0.40
(0.014) (0.011) (0.008)
2004 0.72 0.25 0.13 0.35
(0.014) (0.009) (0.006)
2005 0.65 0.23 0.12 0.36
(0.019) (0.010) (0.007)
2006 0.65 0.23 0.11 0.35
(0.020) (0.011) (0.008)
2007 0.67 0.22 0.10 0.32
(0.020) (0.010) (0.006)
Standard errors in parenthesis. V0 is a headcount index which shows the percentage of farmworkers earning below the
applicable minimum, V1 is the average distance of wages below the minimum, and V2 is the square of this gap which
places more weight on observations furthest below the minimum. V1/V0 is a simple ratio but allows for an easy
interpretation of V1 and can be read as: workers in year ‘x’ on average earn V
1/V0 below the minimum
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more heavily, show even sharper declines. Over the entire period V2 falls by 22 percent
among workers in area A and by 54 percent among workers in area B. In the year dir-
ectly after the law is introduced this measure declines by over 30 percent in both areas.
This suggests that workers further below the minimum in the pre-law period (or simply
those with the lowest wages) were the greatest gainers in the post-law period. From
equation (20) the ratio V1/V0 is simply the percentage shortfall of wages for farm-
workers earning below the minimum; or put differently, violated workers in this sample
are earning on average a fraction V1/V0 below the minimum wage. The data show that
in 2002, workers who earned wages that were below the imminent minimum wage re-
port wages that were on average 34 percent and 48 percent below the legislated mini-
mum in areas A and B, respectively. In 2003, after the introduction of the law, these
percentages fell 26 percent and 39 percent, both quite substantial decreases. The ratio
begins to rise again among workers in area A but for the majority of workers (area B)
the overall decrease in V1/V0 is 32 percent.
To illustrate changes in the depth of violation over time and across the wage distribu-
tion more clearly, Figs. 2 and 3 plot kernel density functions of v1 across individuals for
both the treatment and comparison groups. Equivalent plots for v2 are shown in Figs. 4
and 5. Both figures for farmworkers show that the depth of violation and squared depth
of violation decrease significantly after 2002, suggesting that once the law came into
effect the depth of violation decreased, even if many farmworkers still earned sub-
minimum wages. Crucially, also the V2 density results, reinforce the fact that even
when we place greater weight on workers further below the minimum wage, employers
of these workers were just as likely to partially comply with the law.
The evidence presented here, through the empirical lens of the violation index, and
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V1 - Violation gap
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
Fig. 2 Violation gap (v1) density function (2001–2005), farmworkers. Note: The figure is a kernel density plot of
V1 for all farmworkers (Area A and B), calculated using the minimum wage for each year. Kolmogorov-Smirnov
tests for equality of distributions are rejected at the 5% level for each pairwise comparison of waves in the
before and after periods
Bhorat et al. IZA Journal of Labor & Development  (2015) 4:18 Page 13 of 20margin to the institution of a minimum wage law. In particular, the results show that
despite no ‘spike’ at the minimum wage level in agriculture, employers have responded by
on average increasing the wages paid relative to the legislated minimum. In other words,
there is partial compliance with the minimum wage law. In addition, for those workers
further from the minimum wage, the post-law period yields larger marginal adjustment
toward the minimum, as predicted for certain parameter values by equation (18).
The regression results from equation (21) are presented in Table 4. The model is esti-
mated separately for three dependent variables, which represent the simple measure of
violation (v0), the depth of violation (v1), and the violation gap squared (v2). Each speci-
fication is run with and without comparisons. Columns 2 and 4 include comparisons
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Fig. 3 Violation gap (v1) density function (2001–2005), comparison group. Note: The figure is a kernel
density plot of V2 for all farmworkers (Area A and B), calculated using the minimum wage for each year.
Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests for equality of distributions are not rejected at the 5% level for each pairwise
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V2 - Violation Gap Squared
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
Fig. 4 Violation gap squared (v2) density function (2001–2005), farmworkers. Note: The figure is a kernel
density plot of V2 for all farmworkers (Area A and B), calculated using the minimum wage for each year.
Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests for equality of distributions are rejected at the 5% level for each pairwise
comparison of waves in the before and after periods
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earn lower wages than workers in the comparison group — the average number of
farmworkers who earn below the agricultural minimum wage is higher by 40 percent-
age points in specification 2. Of primary interest is the difference-in-differences estima-
tor (Farmworker*POST). Here the results suggest that relative to workers in the
comparison group, the level of violation falls by approximately 2.5 percent in the post-
law period when we control for individual characteristics. This provides some support
for the descriptive statistics which suggest small declines in v0 after the law was
introduced.
The estimates on v1 initially suggest that the depth of violation among farmworkers
is low relative to the comparison group but this effect disappears when we add con-
trols, suggesting that after taking account of age, education, race and so on, v1 is larger
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Fig. 5 Violation gap squared (v2) density function (2001–2005), comparison group. Note: The figure is a
kernel density plot of V2 for all farmworkers (Area A and B), calculated using the minimum wage for
each year
Table 4 Partial compliance, depth of violation – treatment vs comparison group
Variables v0 v1 v2
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Farmworker 0.299*** 0.399*** 0.0116*** 0.0730*** −0.00344 0.0500***
(0.00575) (0.00677) (0.00413) (0.00506) (0.00396) (0.00434)
POST −0.0246*** 0.0123** −0.0102*** −0.00333 −0.00833** −0.00355
(0.00438) (0.00497) (0.00365) (0.00476) (0.00350) (0.00408)
Farmworker*POST −0.00545 −0.0247*** −0.119*** −0.0883*** −0.0975*** −0.0636***
(0.00741) (0.00784) (0.00530) (0.00592) (0.00507) (0.00508)
Comparisons NO YES NO YES NO YES
Constant 0.450*** 0.732*** 0.481*** 0.552*** 0.304*** 0.353***
(0.00371) (0.0166) (0.00307) (0.0273) (0.00294) (0.0234)
Observations 84,924 58,186 42,760 26,623 42,760 26,623
R-squared 0.077 0.302 0.034 0.129 0.030 0.106
*** p <0.01, ** p <0.05, * p <0.1. Standard errors are in parentheses. V0 is a headcount index which shows the percentage
of farmworkers earning below the applicable minimum, V1 measures the gap between an individual’s wage the
minimum wage, while V2 is the squared gap which gives more weight to wages at the bottom of the distribution. The
minimum wage used to construct both measures is the same for both the treatment and comparison groups
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son group, although the difference is not large. The POSTt coefficient suggests that
when the two groups are taken together no large changes in levels of violation are
observed, but again this difference is small. The difference-in-differences estimator,
however, is both negative and significant for v1 and v2, and remains stable when com-
parisons are added. This reveals that relative to the comparison group, farmworkers ex-
perienced a notable decrease in the depth of violation in the post-law period; when we
control for individual characteristics the average depth of violation fall by almost nine
percent, while the squared gap falls by six percent. The results for v2 provide some
evidence that workers with wages further away from the minimum saw wages rise as a
result of the law, although they continued to earn sub-minimum wages. These results
underscore the trends evident in kernel density distributions showing a move in wages
toward, but not up to, the minimum wage as a result of the law. The notion that this
result is consistent even when placing a higher weight on workers further from the
minimum wage — suggests that partial compliance with the law may be invariant to
how low pre-law wages are.
Table 5 presents the regression results of equation (22), estimated only for the sample
of farmworkers. Here we test for whether compliance with the agricultural minimum
wage falls by more in districts where the average wage gap was larger in the pre-law
period. We do this for v1 and v2. The coefficient on the wage gap is positive and signifi-
cant across all specifications, suggesting that in areas where the district wage gap is lar-
ger, individual levels of violation are higher for the entire period; this is robust to the
addition of comparisons. As in the previous regressions, the POST coefficient suggests
that levels of violation for farmworkers fell in the post-law period. Of primary interest,
the difference-in-differences estimator shows that levels of violation fell by more in
areas where the initial district wage gap was larger. This is robust to addition of
individual-level controls, for both v1 and v2, and suggests changes of 6.8-7.8 percent for
v1 and changes of 7.1-7.9 percent for v2. In other words, we observe greater levels of
Table 5 Partial compliance, depth of violation – wage gap
Variables V1 V2
Wage Gap 0.163*** 0.104*** 0.159*** 0.106***
(0.00435) (0.00701) (0.00403) (0.00607)
POST −0.0517*** −0.0381*** −0.0269*** −0.0130**
(0.00682) (0.00706) (0.00632) (0.00611)
Wage Gap*POST −0.0680*** −0.0780*** −0.0710*** −0.0789***
(0.00699) (0.00865) (0.00647) (0.00749)
Comparisons NO YES NO YES
Constant 0.339*** 0.400*** 0.150*** 0.173***
(0.00471) (0.0407) (0.00437) (0.0352)
Observations 21,230 17,299 21,230 17,299
R-squared 0.135 0.216 0.128 0.185
*** p <0.01, ** p <0.05, * p <0.1. Standard errors are in parentheses. V1 measures the gap between an individual’s wage
the minimum wage, while V2 is the squared gap which gives more weight to wages at the bottom of the distribution.
The minimum wage used to construct both measures is the same for both the treatment and comparison groups
Bhorat et al. IZA Journal of Labor & Development  (2015) 4:18 Page 16 of 20partial compliance in areas where prior to the law, workers were receiving lower wages.
The results also reinforce that workers with larger wages gaps moved closer to the
minimum wage, on average.
Using these regression techniques to examine changes in the depth of violation
serves to illustrate how sub-minimum wages in the agricultural sector have
responded to the introduction of the minimum wage law and supports the descrip-
tive picture presented above. Evidence suggests that while levels of violation
remained high, many employers do not simply make a discrete decision — either
to comply with, or violate, the law. Instead, it would appear that employers choose
by how much to comply with the law, representing this crucial theoretical and em-
pirical observation of partial compliance with the law. In addition to the k-density
functions then, the regressions reveal a wide spread of sub-minimum wages, that
increase partially but not all the way up to the minimum wage, in response to the
law. It is this varied distribution of partial compliance levels — measured and
modelled through v1 and v2 here — which is the important value-add of this paper
in terms of understanding the typology of employer responses to the institution of
minimum wage regulations.
5 Conclusion
When a minimum wage law is introduced, what happens to wages that were below the
legal minimum wage? If there is perfect enforcement, we should not observe any
workers earning below the minimum wage. With imperfect enforcement there will be
wages below the minimum wage, but how does the sub-minimum wage distribution
after the law compare to that distribution before the law was passed? This paper
attempts to provide answers to these questions using the fact that for South Africa,
wage distribution data is available for a period before and after the promulgation of a
minimum wage law in agriculture.
The paper begins by developing a simple theoretical model in which the obvious
benefits of non-compliance for an employer are to be set against the costs of non-
compliance. We model these as composed of the probability of getting caught, and
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non-compliance are possible, including peer effects. We model the costs of non-
compliance as a function of the total short fall of the wage bill compared to full
compliance, allowing for the possibility that employers adjust partially towards the
minimum wage. The model predicts that employment will fall as the result of a
minimum wage, but that a spread of wages below the minimum wage should be
observed in response to the law. Employer responses to a minimum wage law depend on
the level at which the minimum wage is set, relative to the existing wage. Wages will rise
towards the minimum wage, and under certain conditions, the lowest wages will rise pro-
portionately more than those close to the stipulated minimum.
We then turn to an empirical application based on the agriculture sector in South
Africa, focusing on wage effects. We utilise an index of minimum wage violation to es-
timate whether relative compliance levels, measured here by a closing of the average
gap between actual and minimum wages, have changed as a result of the promulgation
of the minima. We find that there is evidence of partial compliance, where employers
adjust wages upwards as a result of the law, but not all the way to the minimum wage.
This supports work by Dinkelman and Ranchhod (2012), Dinkelman et al. (2014) who
observe partial response to the minimum wage law in the Domestic Worker sector in
South Africa. However, unlike Dinkelman and Ranchhod (2012), we find that when the
minimum wage is set at a higher level relative to existing mean wages in a district,
there is evidence of greater partial compliance, which is predicted by the theoretical
model for some parameter values.
The data indicate that while the fraction of workers paid below the minimum wage
decreases over time in response to the law, the levels of non-compliance remain high.
More than half of farmworkers report earning wages below the prescribed minimum in
2007. The relatively low levels of compliance imply that official enforcement efforts,
and non-official pressures, are not sufficient. It may also be plausible that the govern-
ment initially accepted low levels of compliance after the introduction of the law and
thus did not commit substantial resources to enforcement.11 Nonetheless, given that
the state continually engages in numerous enforcement activities to try and ensure
compliance, it is plausible that these formal enforcement efforts have had some observ-
able, if partial, influence on compliance, resulting in some low-level partial compliance
equilibrium.
Based on these results there is scope for more research. Our results suggest strongly
that we need to think of responses to the minimum wage in a continuous rather than a
discrete manner. In particular, our estimates of the depth and severity of violation sug-
gest that whilst employers do respond positively to the introduction of a minimum
wage, this is often not in complete adherence with the law. Moreover, it appears that
areas where wages were lower in the pre-law period, and for workers with wages
further below the minimum wage, we observe greater levels of partial compliance. The
argument for stricter enforcement is further strengthened by the result of our model,
and the more general analysis of Yaniv (2001), that the employment effect depends only
on the minimum wage and not on intensity of enforcement if employers are adjusting
optimally, albeit partially, to the law. This notion of partial compliance with responses
at the margin to the law deserves further and closer attention in the minimum wage
literature.
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1There are in principle three choice variables the employer has: (i) the number of
workers paid the minimum wage; (ii) the number of workers paid the sub-minimum
wage; (iii) the level of the sub-minimum wage. The previous literature fixed (iii) at the
competitive wage, and fixed (i) at zero, leaving only the choice of (ii). Yaniv (2001) also
fixed (iii) at the competitive wage but allowed choice of (i) and (ii). Since our focus in
this paper is on understanding the behaviour of the wage distribution below the
minimum wage, our theory focuses on choice on (iii) but shuts down the distinction
between (i) and (ii)—all workers are paid the subminimum wage. Our specific func-
tional forms give closed form solutions which help in developing comparative statics
and thus in structuring the empirical analysis which is the core of the paper. In fact,
given the linear quadratic structure of our model, and the way the probability of detec-
tion and fines if detected are specified, it can be shown that when choice of (i), (ii) and
(iii) is allowed the choice of (ii) and (iii) lies on a relationship and any choice along this
relationship will be optimal. The particular point along the relationship shown in the
paper is the subminimum wage such that all workers are paid that wage (both opti-
mally chosen). This extension of the model is available from the authors but would
needlessly complicate the exposition here.
2This system runs in tandem with collective bargaining at the industry level (see
Theron et al. 2007).
3An hourly minimum wage is also set, which is equivalent to the monthly rate.
4The next three paragraphs are based on Bhorat et al. (2014), which uses the same
dataset.
5This demarcation was based on the average household income recorded for the
municipal area concerned in the 1996 census, where:
A. Average income greater than Rands 24, 000 per annum
B. Average income between Rands 12, 000 and Rands 24, 000 per annum.
Areas with average income below Rands 12, 000 are included in Area B. Since 2009,
the demarcation between Area A and Area B was removed, and Area A schedules now
apply nationally. We use geographical information on Magisterial Districts and District
Councils in the LFS to demarcate areas A and B.
6We are however, unable to differentiate between place of residence and place of
work for individuals, though we would argue that this is not as problematic for the
agricultural sector as it might be for some other sectors. Although there are no re-
liable national figures we assume that the majority of full-time farmworkers still
live on the farm and there is some evidence to suggest this is so: During the South
African Human Rights Commission’s 2007 hearings on farmworkers and farm
dwellers, Agriculture South Africa stated that, in addition to workers, approxi-
mately 4 million people lived on farms but were not employed there. This suggests
that the number of farmworkers living on farms is still significant if we assume the
average household size for South Africa applies to these households. Moreover, the
Department of Land Affairs held that the majority of full time farmworkers still live on
farms (Human Rights Watch, 2011).
7A new seed is set in STATA for each bracket calculation.
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our results, we tested using agricultural GDP as well as Net Agricultural Income as in-
dependent variables in our regression. Neither variable had any significant impact on
our results.
9This approach follows Lee (1999), and Dinkelman and Ranchhod (2012).
10In order for us to identify the effect of the minimum wage law we must assume that
in the absence of the law change, low wage-gap districts would be on the same trend in
outcomes as high wage gap districts (as in Dinkelman & Ranchhod, 2012). We must
also assume that changes in demand for labor were uniform. A review of the recent
agricultural economics literature for South Africa gives us no reason to believe that
there were price or non-price changes which may have caused labor demand to differ
by geography in the post-law period.
11Interviews in the Western Cape, and a 2012 survey of Labour Inspectors conducted
by the Development Policy Research Unit (DPRU) at the University of Cape Town,
reveal a severe lack of resources in the IES. This is supported by an ILO (2010) report
on the inspectorate in South Africa and administrative data from the Department of
Labour. In particular, there are too few inspectors, inspectors are poorly trained and
under-remunerated for their quasi-legal roles, and Labour Centres are underequipped,
specifically lacking in vehicles and computers according to inspectors and IES officials.
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